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UNITED STATES VS. MACINTOSH -A
SYMPOSIUM
I

By JoHN H. WIGMOao*
In the case of United States v. Macintosh' the petitioner for
naturalization was rejected because on examination he avowed
his intention not to obey the laws of his proposed country if he
believed them tp be unsound and specifically the law exacting military service from all citizens in case of need.
His attitude was the one generally described as that of the
"conscientious objector." And certainly no personality was better
calculated as a test case to present that attitude in the most favorable light. The petitioner (a Canadian by birth and originally a
Baptist clergyman), was a professor in the Yale Divinity School;
therefore a man of exemplary standing. He had voluntarily served
in the Canadian army and with the American Y. M. C. A., in both
cases at the war-front; therefore had proved himself to be neither
a slacker nor a coward. He had a good Scottish name and ancestry; therefore presumably a sturdy genuine conscience, and a
racial congeniality with the fundamental stock of our nation. His
personality thus made it possible to consider squarely the issue
of law without any of those lurking prejudices that have often been
associated with the type of conscientious objector so prominent in
1917-18.
The federal District Court denied his application; the Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed this order; and now the Supreme Court
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1. (May 25, 1931) 283 U. S. 605, 51 Sup. Ct. 570.
[3751
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affirms the original order of the District Court, though only by a
five to four vote, with a dissenting opinion filed by the four.
It must be confessed at the outset that both opinions are disappointing. The majority opinion nmits to emphasize some of the
strongest .considerations in its support; the minority opinion invokes as a main argument an inapplicable authority.
What is the law and what the facts?
The Naturalization Act requires 2 that the petitioner for admission to citizenship
"Third, . . . shall declare on oath in open court that he will
support the Constitution of the United States; . . . that he will

support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and
allegiance to the same." [It further requires] "Fourth," [that the court
shall be satisfied that the petitioner] "has behaved as a man of good
moral character attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of
the same."
The only part of this oath and legal definition that was expressly encountered by the petitioner's avowed attitude was the
one labeled "third," viz., that he will "bear true faith and allegiance
to the same," i. e., the Constitution and the laws. The prior clause,
"support and defend the Constitution and the laws against all
enemies foreign and domestic," could be interpreted to apply to
military service; yet, as "foreign enemies" do not nominally make
war against the Constitution and the laws, this clause may also be
interpreted not to mean military service. But the last clause, "bear
true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and the laws," means
plainly a readiness to give honest submission and obedience to those
laws.
And what was the petitioner's attitude? On his examination
in answer to the standard questions, "20, Are you willing to take
this oath in becoming a citizen? 22, If necessary, are you willing to
take up arms in defense of this country?" he answered thus:
"20 and 22. I am willing to do what I judge to be in the best
interests of my country, but only in so far as I can believe that this is
not going to be against the best interests of himanity in the long run.
I do not undertake to support 'my country, right or wrong' in any
dispute which may arise, and I am not willing to promise beforehand,
and without knowing the cause for which my country may go to war,
either that I will or that I will not 'take up arms in defense of this
2. U. S. Code, title 8, sec. 381.
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country,' however 'necessary' the war may seem to be to the government
of the day.
"It is only in a sense consistent with these statements that I am
willing to promise to 'support and defend' the government of the United
State 'against all enemies, foreign and domestic.' But, just because I
am not certain that the language of questions 20 and 22 will bear the
construction I should have to put upon it in order to be able to answer
them "inthe affirmative, I have to say that I do not know that I can
say 'Yes' in answer to these two questions."
On further examination he answered (as summarized in the
opinion) as follows:
"He is ready to give to the United States all the allegiance he ever
had given or ever could give to any country, but he could not put
allegiance to the government of any country before allegiance to the
will of God

.

.

.

He did not question that the government under

certain conditions could regulate and restrain the conduct of the individual citizen, even to the extent of imprisonment. He recognized the
principle of the submission of the individual citizen to the opinion'
of the majority in a democratic country; but he did not believe in
having his owin moral problenms solved for him. by the majority. The
position thus taken was the only one he could take consistently with
his moral principles and with what he understood to be the moral
principles of Christianity."
These answers fatally disqualified him from admission to citizenship under the law. The reasons can be briefly stated under
three heads.
(a) The literal terms of the oath could not be fulfilled by
him. He is required to undertake to submit to "the laws"-not
some laws, but all laws in general. He announces that he will
submit to all the laws except those requiring military service. Those
laws are not minor nor negligible ones; they are an important group
of laws. During the World War of 1914-18, the whole legal
system was affected. There were some twenty principal war laws,
all directed to help win the war; and the whole economic system
was temporarily altered by them. This applicant, then, if a particular future war should by him be deemed unjustifiable, would
be found unsubmissive to all these auxiliary laws-potentially at
least. An extensive reservation like this could not be ignored.
He is not qualified to take this oath.
Looking beyond the literal terms of the oath, and exam(b)
ining its significance in policy, we find the policy to be fundamental.
For a hundred and forty years, our federal law continuously has
declared the liability of every able-bodied citizen, between the ages
of eighteen and forty-five, to bear arms when called upon. What
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policy justifies this? The nature of a nation's existence. The
nation exists to protect the welfare of the united citizenry-"pne.
for all, and all for one"; the government is the means to that end
in domestic welfare. The army, the navy, and the executive as
their clief, are the means to that end in international welfare.
That end implies a contribution of every citizen to the common
effort. There are duties that go with the benefits. A man cannot
apply for the benefits of citizenship and yet expect to reject the
burdens. One of the burdens is taxes; another is defense of the
nation against foreign aggression. The latter affects the very existence of the nation. To live as a citizen and accept all the benefits, but then to reject a principal burden when the time comes
to impose it, is inconsistent.' The motive is immaterial; the fact
would be intolerable.
Apply this attitude to an applicant for membership in any other
organized body, and see how. absurd it would be to recognize it.
There are bar associations, fraternities, churches, lodges. The aplicant is tendered the pledge; he palters, and explains: "I do
want to join your lodge; I want all the social, business, political,
insurance, and other benefits that your lodge offers. But when
you ask me to pledge support to all your rules-well, I may and
I may not. Some of them I may at some time deem unwise. It
depends on how I feel when the time comes. Just let me write
my own obligation, viz., to support your lodge if and when I see
fit." Of course such a candidate would be shown the lodge doors.
The point is, then, that the policy of our Naturalization Act
is entirely sound, in that it demands a pledge to bear allegiance
to our laws as a system, and not only to those which the applicant
may personally deem sound; and that any applicant who reserves
the right to choose which laws he will support may justly be
rejected.
(c) This brings us to the third reason, viz., that if this particular applicant may reserve the right of disobedience to this particular set of laws, then logically the next applicant, and the next,
and the next, may be admitted with reservation of the right to
disobey some other law or set of laws. The issue is made plain
by this applicant's avowal. "He did not believe in having his own
moral problems solved for him by the majority." This is a general principle, and, if sanctioned by the Naturalization Act, the
same principle can be invoked by any other applicant for any other
law that happens to be repugnant to him. Suppose that he believes
taxation laws to be repugnant to his moral sense-or monogamy
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laws, or property laws. On the Macintosh principle he would be
none the less qualified to become a citizen. The variety of reserved
rights of non-allegiance would be infinite and endless.
In short, the Macintosh principle is nothing less than the
right of individual secession. The claim of this supposed right
for states very nearly proved fatal to our existence as a nation.
It would be no less dangerous if conceded to all aliens seeking
citizenship. (The majority opinion of the Supreme Court touches
on this consideration in two single sentences, but not with adequate
emphasis.)
Its logic is potent with practical consequences. A
general right of individual withdrawal from allegiance to any and
every repugnant law would be intolerable.
Turning now to the minority opinion, it is surprising to note
its inattention to the true history of our federal legislation in exemption of religious objectors. The main argument of the minority
opinion is this, that "the long-established practice [of Congress]
of excusing from military service those whose religious convictions
oppose it confirms the view that the Congress in the terms of the
oath did not intend to require a promise to give such service."
Now the opinion herein ignores the legislative history, in that
religious convictions have been sharply distinguished from merely
conscientious convictions, and that the exemption (in varying
phrase) has been limited to the former class. The early New York
statute of 1777 (quoted in the opinion) exempts "inhabitants of
this State being of the people called Quakers." The latest pronouncement, in the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, sec. 4,
provided that nothing herein
"shall be construed to require or compel any person to serve in any of
the forces herein provided for who is found to be a member of any
well-recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and
existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to
participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are
against war or participation therein in accordance with the creed or
principles of said religious organizations, but no person so exempted
shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall
declare to be non-combatant."
The "policy of Congress in granting exemptions in such cases"
(as repeatedly referred to in the minority opinion) must be deemed
to be most deliberately embodied in this latest act of, 1917. The act
is cited in the opinion, though not quoted. But a perusal of it
shows that in three respects it does not fit the Macintosh case.
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(a) In the first place, the act does not "excuse from military
service" (the expression used in the minority opinion). It exempts from combatant service only; it expressly retains the military
service in non-combatant capacity. It does declare "ministers of
religion" and government officials to be "exempt from the selective
draft," i. e., entirely; but it then declares religious-creed members
to be exempt from combatant service only. Thus it retains their
general military obligation, but assigns them to the non-combatant
part of that military service. This represented an appreciably large
portion of the military body; the total number of men reaching
France in 1917-18 was 2,084,000, and of these men some 540,000
were non-combatants; "the proportion of non-combatants in the
American Army never fell below twenty-eight per cent" ;8 in addition there were the auxiliary non-combatant bodies of Red Cross
and Y. M. C. A. participants.
The historic and politic reason for this distinction (between
combatant and non-combatant) made in the act of 1917 is of course
the Scriptural injunction against "shedding man's blood," which is
at the basis of most of the religious creeds opposed to war. This
permits such creeds to perform military service provided they take
no part in blood-shedding.
The minority opinion is therefore incorrect in stating broadly
that the policy of Congress, as shown in the statutes, is to "excuse from military service" on this ground.
(b)
Next, even the exemption from combatant service, as
embodied in the act of 1917 (quoted above), extends only to a
creed forbidding "to participate in war in any form." In these
creeds, the believers are opposed to all war, even definsive war.
It is a complete non-resistance creed; and as such, and such only,
does it receive the tolerance of Congress. But the Macintosh principle was different. The applicant was not opposed to all war,
but only to some wars; he had already taken an active part in one
war; in the future he might be willing to take part in another
war; but he was to be the one to select the wars he would support.
He would not be entitled to the benefit of the statute in case of war;
and the minority opinion could not properly rely on the statute as
germane to the Macintosh case.
(c) Lastly, and most important, the statute gives its partial
exemption to those only who are "members of a well-recognized
religious sect or organizationwhose principles forbid its members to
3. Leonard P. Ayres "The War with Germany, a Statistical Summary"
pp. 53, 101.
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participate in war in any form." This is the vital distinction between religious and merely conscientious objectors. Macintosh did
not in any answer claim to belong to a "religious sect or organization" as described in the statute. His answers do indeed incidentally mention "God" and "Christianity" twice; but his basic principle is morality; moreover, it is solely his own moral idea that
controls-"I want to be free to judge." "I am willing to do what
I judge to be in the best interests of my country." His claim was
a purely individual one, not based on the creed of any "religious
sect or organization."
Why did Congress limit its tolerance to members of "wellrecognized religious sects or organizations?" For the very practical reason that by this limitation alone could the masses of -weakkneed intellectual slackers be prevented from sheltering under, and
abusing, this privilege. As it was, the selective service boards received some 65,000 claims of creed-members under the statute,
and allowed some 57,000 of them, representing some thirteen distinct religious bodies. 4 The service boards administered the law
liberally on such evidence of creeds and creed-membership as was
obtainable; but even thus there was plenty of pretended or eleventhhour "membership" in these bodies. One board official, nauseated
by the hypocritical resort to this privilege in his neighborhood, reported that "from practical experience this section of the law was
pernicious, unjust, and in all respects a mistake."5'
Had the law extended its tolerance to the mere ihdividual
"conscientious objector," not openly professing, membership in a
pacifist religious sect, but waiting till war-time to discover and
profess his scruples, there is no telling how many tens of thousands
of slackers would have claimed and received this protection. In
short, the only workable basis for such an exemption is the "wellrecognized religious organization"; and that is the only one to which
Congress extends its tolerance.
The Macintosh claim was devoid of any such feature. The
invocation of the Congressional policy and statute in the minority
opinion is therefore irrelevant. We confess ourselves respectfully
surprised to find the opinion venturing to expend such lengthy
labor upon this argument; for a perusal of the text of the act of
1917 must have revealed its triple inapplicability to the case in hand.
A similar case, as attractive as the Macintosh petition, is hardly
4. Second Report of the Provost Marshal General, Dec. 1918, p. 57.
5. Report ibid. p. 323.
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likely to recur. But we believe that, if it does, its rejection can
be placed on grounds which would not again permit of dissent.
II
By

KENNETH C. SZARS*

Dean Wigmore's comment on the Macintosh case considered
in the light (or the heat) of other comments on this and the
Schwimmer case' seems to demonstrate that the subject matter is
very likely to kindle the emotions. Accordingly, dispassionate
consideration and an objective judgment become difficult.
Considerable could be written in a critical analysis of Colonel
Wigmore's comment. Suffice to say at this point that he seems to
have overstated his argument when he refers to the "triple inapplicability" of the argument in the minority opinion as rendered
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes concerning the tradition of the country with reference to a certain type of religious objectors. The
distinction that has been made in federal legislation in this country
between conscientious objectors and members of a well-recognized
religious sect which is opposed to war was set forth by Mr. Donald
B. MacGuineas in a recent number of this review. 7 The writer,
however, does not understand that Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and
other members of the Supreme Court who agreed with him were
making any argument that Mr. Macintosh's case was controlled
by the notion that he, as a possible conscientious objector, was
nevertheless entitled to take the oath and be admitted to citizenship.
On the contrary the argument of the minority was that the matter
should be considered from the point of view of a person who in
the future might apply for citizenship and who -as a member of
a well-recognized religious sect opposed to war in any form would
be able to take the position that he, though an alien, is in the same
class as many citizens of the United States who have been for a
long time exempt from combatant service. From this point of
view the writer does not think that the argument of the minority
was inapplicable. However, the main purpose of this additional
comment will be to emphasize a few observations which have already found their way into print. Dean Carpenter's letter in the
American Bar Association Journal' and Professor Freund's re*Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
6. U. S. v. Schtwimmer' (1929) 279 U. S. 644, 49 Sup. Ct. 448, 73 L.
Ed. 889.
7. (1931) 25 ILLINoIs LAW REWviz 723.
8. 17 Am. Bar Ass'n Jour. 551.
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view of the Schwimmer case9 have anticipated this comment to
some extent, at least.
In the first place the dogmatism of Mr. Wigmore's remarks
seems to be unjustified. In the Schwimrmer case (which has been
distinguished from the other two cases), the district judge and
six judges of the Supreme Court were on one side; three judges
of the Circuit Court of Appeals and three judges of the Supreme
Court were on the other side. In the Macintosh case the district
judge and five members of the Supreme Court were of one opinion; three judges of the Circuit Court of Appeals and four judges
of the Supreme Court were of the other opinion. The line-up in
the Bland case was the same as the Macintosh case except that a
presumably different district judge was unfavorable to naturalization. All of this would seem to demonstrate that the question is
one upon which able and fair-minded individuals will differ.
Regardless of this, it seems to be reasonably clear that the
controversy is pathetically futile. The tangible result to date, so far
as known, has been the exclusion from citizenship of two women
and one man, all of whom are among the best for citizenship save
for the notion of supporting some future war which may not occur
during their lives. If Mr. Macintosh and Miss Bland, at least,
had crossed their fingers and had taken the oath without explaining their ideas, even the Chicago Tribune might have been contented. Thus, they pay the penalty for having sensitive consciences; the very quality that should make them desirable citizens
in all things except possibly one is the quality that results in their
exclusion from citizenship. The pity of it is that this barrier being
largely subjective will mean nothing to such individuals as "Mops"
Volpe. The oath thus tends to work inversely, i. e., ke~ps out the
best in some instances and is no barrier to the worst applicants.
Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the oath will mean anything significant to the large mass of applicants. Most applicants
probably will regard the oath as a part of the rigmarole of being
admitted, and if impressed at all will not be too much impressed.
The truth seems to be that despite a few interesting cases, this
country must take its chances about the admission of aliens who
may resist governmental processes in future wars. The causes of
opposition to war are so various, the state of public opinion, locally
and nationally, on the subject is so fluctuating that an average
person cannot be expected to visualize the circumstances that will
9. 7 N. Y. U. L.Q. R. 157.
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surround future wars. Then why exclude only very cautious individuals with New England consciences?
An oath seems to be an unsatisfactory means of testing the
likelihood of good citizenship. It has broken down as a means of
obtaining truth from a witness. If an oath is needed in naturalization proceedings for some formal purpose why not make it as
colorless as possible and then resort to other means to ascertain
the essential facts concerning the applicant? We need a more objective method of testing. Section 4 of the naturalization act
provides for ascertainment of the facts about a person. Probably
it should be amplified. Search the man's record and ascertain how
he has lived, abroad as well as in this country. If all of this is
done now under departmental regulations, then nothing more can
be done except to perfect the technique and so far as possible
choose the best who offer themselves. Why strain at an oath which
will result only in eliminating some of our best prospects?
III
By ERNST FREUND*

Two collateral questions are suggested by the foregoing two
comments upon the decision in the Macintosh case as well as by
the decision itself: First: If the law requires as a condition precedent to admission either to citizenship or to any
other position of public trust the taking of a prescribed form
of oath, is it the presumable intent of the legislature that
there shall or may be an inquiry into the truth or falsity
of the oath? By the common law of evidence it is legitimate
to ascertain whether the sanctions of the oath are operative in
point of conscience, but the power of inquiry stops at that point.
The terms of the oath prescribed by the Naturalization Act are
admittedly vague and fall short of any standard of legal precision.
The eventuality of a defense of the Constitution and laws of the
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, is .as remote, as the bearing of true faith and allegiance to the same is
subjective and undefinable. Phrases such as these may be appropriate to a solemn utterance meant to impress moral sense and
conscience, but defy minute and logical analysis. The statute in
the fourth paragraph of section 4, where it prescribes, not the terms
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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of an oath, but the evidence to be presented for admission, uses
words of entirely different import and character; and by laying
down the test of behavior in connection with the criterion of attachment to the Constitution, divests even that criterion of the
ambiguity which it might have if used merely as descriptive of a
state of mind. On legal principles, the statute would appear to be
satisfied by the willingness to take the required oath; the difficulty is that the appeal to sentiment or emotion which the oath
involves injects itself into the interpretation of the statute, and has
extended the scope of the examination until it becomes a searching
inquiry into the conscience of the applicant.
Second: It is of course conceded that the first point made has
no support in any of the opinions filed in either the Schwinmer
or the Macintosh cases; not only that, but all the courts that have
dealt with the statute have ignored the plain fact that the statutory
criterion is not attachment to the Constitution but behavior for a
period of five years as a person attached to the Constitution. What
we get from the wider and, it is believed, unwarranted construction placed upon the law, is a marked division of judicial opinion
with the usual result that there is no general acquiescence in the
final decision by a bare majority. Whatever may be thought of
the right or wrong of the decision, the law as interpreted leaves
the qualifications for admission to citizenship in an undesirable
state of uncertainty. True, naturalization is a privilege, but Congress never intended to make it a matter of judicial discretion.
Such a criterion as attachment to the Constitution, if the behavior
test is abandoned, is hopelessly uncertain. An instrument which
invites amendment can demand attachment only in a qualified sense;
and a close analysis of attachment leads to contradictory results
when we remember that the federal and the state constitutions proclaim diametrically opposite principles of administrative organization. If Congress intended the naturalization law to mean what
the courts have interpreted it to mean, the tests of admission to
citizenship may vary with the political bias of the courts that administer it. It would then be more logical to adopt the English
plan according to which the naturalization of an alien would lie
in the absolute discretion of the Secretary of State. If the legislative policy is one of objective tests, the statute should be given
a corresponding phrasing and construction.
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IV
By FREDERICK GREEN*

"Conscience fills a man full of obstacles; it beggars every man
that keeps it; it is turned out of all towns and cities for a.dangerous thing." This was sometime a paradox; but now the time
gives it proof, for these words of the "second murderer" in the
play of Richard the Third are confirmed by the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Macintosh case. Professor Macintosh was debarred from naturalization because his
conscience would not let him promise to fight in every war however
unjust he deemed the cause or however disastrous the object.
This does not, of itself, imply a criticism of the court rather
than of Congress. To those who like the result it should not imply
a criticism of either. It is for Congress to lay down the qualifications for naturalization, and for the courts to decide what the rules
of Congress mean.
Congress has said that an alien may not become a citizen unless he is white or of African nativity or descent. It may be hard
to see why the child of a Japanese woman by a European father
should be made ineligible because not white,' 0 and a child of the
same woman by a Senegambian savage be admitted as of African
descent; or why a son of Mr. Gandhi"' should be excluded if born
under the Stars and Stripes in the Philippines, 2 and eligible by
virtue of African nativity if born in Cape Town, where Mr. Gandhi used to live, but Congress seems to have decreed it so.
Congress also requires that an applicant for naturalization shall
show that for the five preceding years "he has behaved as a man
of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order
and happiness of the same," and that he shall declare on oath that
he abjures all foreign allegiance and will "support and defend the
Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies,
foreign and' domestic and bear true faith and allegiancd to the
same." Professor Macintosh had fulfilled the conditions about behavior and was ready to take the oath. But the statute also says
that the testimony of two witnesses "as to the facts of residence,
moral character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitu*Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
10. In re Young. (1912) 198 Fed. 715; Takao Ozawa v. United States
(1922) 260 U. S. 178.
11. United States v. Bhagat Singh (1923) 261 U. S. 204.
12. In re Alverto (1912) 198 Fed. 688.
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tion shall be required." It further provides that the petition for
naturalization shall substantially follow a prescribed form, which
states, among other things, "I am attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States." The court thinks that good behavior and a willingness to take the oath are not enough, and that
an applicant is not entitled to be naturalized unless he is in fact
attached to the principles of the Constitution and takes the oath
with intent to keep it according to its true meaning. There was no
dissent on this point.
Mr. Macintosh, a native of Canada, is a professor of theology
at Yale. He served in the World War as chaplain in the Canadian
army. When questioned in the naturalization proceedings, he said
that he would bear arms only in a war which he believed to be
morally justified and would not promise to fight irrespective of
the cause of the war or if he believed it to be against the best
interests of humanity to do so. In the words of Mr. Justice
Sutherland, who wrote the majority opinion:
"He recognized the principle of the submission of the individual
citizen to the majority in a democratic country: but he did not believe
in having his own moral opinions solved for him by the majority. The
position thus taken was the only one he could take consistently with
his moral principles and with what he understood to be the principles
of Christianity;

. . . he is convinced that the individual citizen

should have the right to withhold his military services when his best
moral judgment compels him to do so."
There is a distinction between a war which it was not justifiable to declare and a war in which, when it is going on, it is not
justifiable to engage. "Beware of entrance to a quarrel; but, being
in, bear it that the opposer .may beware of thee." Similarly to
say that a law is not justifiable is one thing, and to say that
obedience to it is not justifiable is another. In some of Professor
Macintosh's statements, and in some of the language of the majority opinion these propositions are perhaps confused, so that it is
possible that the actual decision is only that a man is not entitled
to naturalization whose willingness to bear arms depends upon his
approval of the motives of those who decreed the war.
But the doctrine laid down goes farther. In the first place, the
opinion says that the case is ruled in principle by United States v.
Schwimmer.13 With this statement Mr. justice Stone probably
disagrees. He concurred in the Schwinmmer decision, but dissents
in the Macintosh case. Mrs. Schwimmer was an uncompromising
13. Supra, note 6.
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pacifist "opposed to the use of military force as contemplated by
the Constitution" and "disposed to exert her power to influence
others to such opposition." She was held to be disqualified for
citizenship because she did not believe in, and was unwilling to
act upon, what it was thought that the words of the Constitution
(established expressly to "provide for the common defense" as
well as to "secure the blessings of liberty") show to be one of its
fundamental principles-"the duty of citizens by force of arms to
defend our government against all enemies whenever necessity
arises." Professor Macintosh is not opposed to all wars. He does
not, like Mrs. Schwimmer, deny the duty to defend the government
when necessity arises. But he wants to judge the necessity for
himself. He is unwilling to promise in advance to be an accomplice in whatever act of international piracy persons who temporarily get control of the government may commit the country to under
the name of war. It is this which is considered in his case to disqualify him for citizenship. Therefore to say that the Macintosh
case is within the principle of the Schwimmer case means that a
person is lacking in attachment to the principles of the Constitution,
within the meaning of the Naturalization Act, not only if he believes war illegitimate in itself and refuses in toto to engage in
combatant service, but also unless he is willing to serve, if conscripted, in any future war irrespective of the character of that
particular war. It seems to follow that the oath to defend the
Constitution and laws is an oath so to serve if required, and that
both the oath and attachment to the principles of the Constitution
necessitate willingness to perform any kind of service in war that
shall lawfully be required. And it would be a reasonable inference
that attachment to the principles of the Constitution and the oath
to support the laws require willingness to obey any law whatever
in time of peace as well as in time of war, despite all scruples
arising from the character of the law.
That the majority so believe and that they intend so to announce appears from the following passages of the opinion:
"The applicant for naturalization . . . is unwilling to leave
the question of his future military service to the wisdom of Congress
where it belongs . . . When he speaks of putting his allegiance
to the will of God above his allegiance to the government, it is evident
in the light of his entire statement that he means to make his own
interpretationof the will of God the decisive test which shall conclude

the government and stay its hand.

We are a Christian people

. .

But, also, we are a Nation . . . whose government must go forward upon the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that
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unqualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the
laws of the land, as well as those made for war as those made for peace,
are not inconsistent with the will of God.
"The applicant here rejects that view.

.

.

. Upon what ground

of distinction may we hereafter reject another applicant who shall
express his willingness to . . . obey any future statute only upon
the condition that he shall entertain the opinion that it is morally justified?

.

.

.

The applicant's attitude, in effect, is a refusal to take

the oath of allegiance except in an altered form."
The doctrine of the case, then is: First, that the oath to
support and defend tlie Constitution and laws of the United States
against all enemies and to bear true faith and allegiance is an oath
to do whatever a valid law may require regardless of what sort
of law, it is; and, secondly, that a person unwilling to give "unqualified

.

.

submission and obedience to the laws of the

land" in peace or in war, regardless of the character of the law,
is not attached to the principles of the Constitution, within the
meaning of the Naturalization Act.
Is this a reasonable construction of the act?
The oath to support and defend the Constitution and laws
against all enemies is not an oath to do all one can do to prevent
others from breaking laws. Nor is it an oath to fight all enemies.
If it were, it would be an oath to volunteer. But the court construes it as only an oath to serve if required by law to do so. In
other words it is, at most, an oath to act as a good citizen should.
That a good citizen should not refuse to fight because of conscientious scruples is only the opinion of the court. Neither the
Constitution nor the Naturalization Act says so.
The dissenting opinion, written by Chief Justice Hughes, and
concurred in by Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone, points out
that the oath is in substance the same which has been required
for more than sixty years of civil officers in general, and which
was surely not intended to impose a religious qualification for
office holding by excluding those whose religion forbids them to
bear arms, nor to bar from civil office any of the conscientious
objectors whom it has been the unvarying policy of Congress not
to require to serve as combatants. To this argument, however,
the majority might perhaps answer that the oath of office is to be
construed as relating only to the proper discharge of the duties
of the office, and the oath of citizenship as relating to the duties
of citizenship. If this answer is deemed satisfactory, it brings us
back to the question whether it is a principle of American political
theory that a good citizen will engage in any war against his con-
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science and against what he believes to be the will of God, provided that his government, in spite of that fact, should happen to
order him to do so; and whether, if so, the words of the oath,
reasonably construed, include a promise that he will.
Said Mr. Chief Justice Hughes:
"In the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than
the State has always been maintained. The reservation of that supreme
obligation, as a matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by
many of our conscientious and law abiding citizens. The essence of
religion is a belief in a relation to'God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation . . . One cannot speak of
religious liberty, with proper appreciation of its essential and historic
significance, without assuming the existence of a belief in supreme
allegiance to the will of God

.

.

.

There is abundant room for

enforcing the requisite authority of law as it is enacted and requires
obedience, and for maintaining the conception of the supremacy of
law as essential to orderly government, without demanding that either
citizens or applicants for citizenship shall assume by oath an obligation
to regard allegiance to God as subordinate to allegiance to civil power."
If the oath of allegiance is an oath to serve in any war, however unlikely a war of that character may be, it would seem to be
also an oath to render in such war such service, however unlikely
its character, as shall be lawfully required, in spite of conscientious
objections to the character of the service. That is an oath which
a scrupulous and thoughtful man would not willingly take. So
construed, it would exclude desirable citizens and offer no bar to
the unscrupulous. Such a construction would defeat the purpose
for which the oath is required. Who would swear to blow up
another Lusitania, and to commit any other atrocity that a government conceivably might require? "From its very nature," says
Mr. Justice Sutherland, "the war power

.

.

tolerates no

qualifications or limitations, unless found in the Constitution or
in applicable principles of international law." Why international
law? Is an act of Congress void if contrary to international law?
If not, does the oath permit an exception in favor of international
law that is not permissible in favor of the law of God? War
wantonly made is itself a violation of international law. 14 But the
very point Mr. justice Sutherland is trying to establish is .that the
applicant must be willing to fight in such a war if it should happen
to come. One wonders if this attempt to seek shelter under international law does not betray a feeling that an oath of unqualified
14. See authorities cited in Macintosh v. United States (1930) 42 F.
(2d) 845, 848.
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obedience in military service to the law of the land is unreasonable.
to take or to require. May an applicant be asked if there is any
conceivable lawful order which under any conceivable circumstance
he would be unwilling to obey, and excluded if he answers, Yes?
An oath is not taken with mental reservation unless it is taken
with intent not to perform it under circumstances which may with
some likelihood occur. To hold otherwise would be much like
charging a man with unforeseeable consequences of a lawful act.
But if the oath is construed as only a promise to render all military
service which there is any likelihood the applicant will be called
on to perform, a person like Professor Macintosh should be allowed
to take it. The United States has renounced war as an instrument
of policy. Presumably it will not engage in war unjustly. Presumably an intelligent citizen will recognize the justice of his country's
cause. Even if he should not, Congress has never undertaken to
compel a person to bear arms against his religious scruples, and it
is unlikely that it ever will. An oath to support and defend the
Constitution and laws should not be construed as a promise to do
what cannot be compelled under the Constitution and laws as they
now are. As well might it be construed as a promise to conform
to an established religion, if in the future the Constitution should
be so changed as to permit Congress to establish a religion. The
present Constitution and laws constitute a governmental system. It
ought to be enough if the applicant swears to accept that system
as it is. But Mr. Justice Sutherland says:
"The applicant . . . is unwilling to rely, as every native born
citizen is obliged to do, upon the probable continuance by Congress of
the long established and approved practice of exempting the honest
conscientious objector, while at the same time asserting his willingness
to conform to whatever the future law constitutionally shall require
of him."
The statement is not literally true. The applicant was perfectly
willing to rely on the probable continuance of the practice and in
reliance on it he wanted to become a citizen, and take his chances,
just as every native citizen takes his chances, of any change in the
Constitution or the laws which might make him liable to punishment if he should be unwilling to conform. At any rate, in view
of the high improbability that Professor Macintosh's military
scruples would ever bring him into conflict with the law, it would
seem he ought to have been treated in this regard as Mrs. Schwimmer ought to have been treated if her only reservation were that
she would not swear to shoot her Hungarian son, husband or daugh-

26 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

ter, if she chanced to meet them as enemies on the field of battle.
There is nothing in the Schwimnner case to show that its "principle" goes as far as to exclude her for that.
It is hard to see what the United States gains by losing the
military service which Professor Macintosh might give, if admitted, through refusing to admit him, for fear that under unlikely
circumstances he might not give it.
The second proposition to be deduced from the opinion is
that it is a principle of the Constitution that good citizenship requires not merely obedience to law in general, but unqualified submission to each and every valid law, so that a person unwilling
so to submit and obey is not only disqualified to take the oath to
support the laws, but is not attached to the principles of the Constitution.
The Boer War, the Mexican War and the Spanish War make it
plain that wars are not waged for defense alone, so that there
seems little reason to distinguish between obedience to laws of war
and obedience to laws of peace, and the opinion makes no distinction.
Perhaps in spite of their sweeping language the court regards
the constitutional principle as only forbidding disobedience to law
proceeding from dislike of the law itself, as distinguished from
peculiar hardship involved in obedience under special circumstances.
For example, a man who dodges his income tax because he does
not want to pay it is clearly, in the view of the court, not attached
to the principles of the Constitution; but a man who, without the
formality of getting an excuse, neglects jury service to stay at the
bedside of a dying wife, or a physician who violates a speed law
upon an urgent call, may perhaps be cleared of disloyalty. Yet
it is hard to see why, if the law is technically violated, they are
entitled, on the court's theory, to do what it is said that Professor
Macintosh was not entitled to do, to judge for themselves the necessity of obedience instead of leaving it to the wisdom of the
legislature to make the necessary exceptions. On the other hand
a person who would not violate a speed law to save a life should
probably be excluded as not of good moral character. This places
him between the devil and the deep sea. And one is led to wonder
what loyalty to constitutional principle requires of a person who
wants to embark on an enterprise helpful in promoting prosperity,
if he knows there is some chance it may be held to violate the AntiTrust Act. May he assume to set up his private judgment as to
what is for "the best interests of humanity," and conducive to
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"the good order and happiness" of his country against the chance
of disobedience to the law?
One might have supposed that a -man who believes that the
form of government and the rules for conducting it laid down in
the Constitution are the best that could be devised, and who is
ready to shed his blood in their defense is attached to the principles
of the Constitution, and that, if he, nevertheless, is resolved to make
his living by a fraudulent use of the mails, the objection to his
naturalization is only that he is not of good moral character or
cannot in good faith take oath to support the laws.
But Mr. Justice Sutherland says that our government can
safely proceed upon no other assumption than that unqualified
obedience to its laws is not inconsistent with the will of God. The
statement is only relevant because of the consequence which the
course of the argument shows is conceived to follow from it, that
it is a principle of the Constitution that the yoice of Congress is
to be accepted as the voice of God, and that one who insists on
making "his own interpretation of the will of God the decisive
test which shall control the government and stay its hand" is not
attached to the principles of the Constitution within the meaning
of the Naturalization Act.
There is confusion here. Nobody insists on staying the government's hand. The government may punish the conscientious violator of law as much as it wants. All he insists on controlling is his
own conduct. He raises no question about legal duty. Nobody
doubts that legal duty is unqualified, because legal duty is only a
name for one aspect of the will and power of government to enforce unqualified obedience. To say that if there is a legal duty
it is unqualified is to say that if I am indebted to you in the sum
of ten dollars, I owe you that amount. It is a proposition that
nobody can deny and nobody can act upon, and therefore it is incapable of being a principle of the Constitution. That the legal
duty of obedience to law is unqualified is no more a principle of
the Constitution than it is a principle of the Constitution that it
was framed in 1787. It is only a characteristic of legal duty in
fact.
The material question is whether every violation of legal duty
committed because of disapproval of the law is necessarily a manifestation of bad citizenship and condemned by some principle of
the Constitution.
It may be natural for a judge whose life is spent in vindicating the claims of law, and to whom the unqualified character of
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legal duty to obey the law is axiomatic, to attribute a similar primacy to moral duty to obey the law and to place it above other
moral duties. It is not natural for the mari -in the street to do
so. To him obedience to law is one duty among many others.
Ordinarily there is no conflict between duties, but, if conflict arises,
the duty to obey law seems to him to have no necessary or inherent
supremacy. If it is a principle of the Constitution that it should
have supremacy, it is doubtful that many citizens are attached
to that principle. So far from thinking that the government can
safely proceed only "upon the assumption . . . that unqualified . . . submission and obedience to the laws . . . are
not inconsistent with the will of God," an ordinary person would
be apt to say that it is dangerous for the government to proceed
upon such an assumption, and that a government that habitually
does so is a bad government. He would say that instead of taking it for granted that its laws are in accordance with God's will,
the government should take anxious thought to make and keep
them so; that a nation that goes to war taking it for granted that
its cause is just, may find, in victory or in defeat, that the assumption "Gott mit uns" was a delusion. Nothing is to be gained by a
fictional attribution to government of moral infallibility. And if it
is dangerous to take for granted that laws are consistent with
God's will, it is also dangerous to take for granted that God wills
obedience to them. Nothing is gained by deifying law. Does history show it to be just, expedient, or safe for Caesar to demand
of his subjects what his subjects think should be rendered unto
God? Perhaps the ordinary citizen agrees with Mr. Chief justice
Hughes that there is abundant room for enforcing the authority
of law without requiring that allegiance to God be regarded as subordinate to allegiance to civil power.
That the moral duty to obey the law should be given precedence
over all other moral duty is something that the majority judges
read into the Constitution. The Constitution says nothing about
it, so it can only be imputed to the Constitution because the judges
think that that is the way a good citizen should behave.
This seems a strange doctrine for a nation that had its origin
in rebellion; a rebellion which, like most others, began in illegal
acts of small groups. It slanders the nation's birth, and declares
it illegitimate. It seems a strange doctrine for a nation whose
first national pronouncement echoed the words of Patrick Henry,
"Give me liberty, or give me death," and asserted the right of rebellion against unrighteous laws. How can there be rebellion if
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nobody is at liberty to cast the first stone? It seems a strange doctrine concerning a Constitution which recognizes that obedience
should not be required to all laws that Congress may make on subjects within its granted powers, a Constitution which so recognizes
the possibility of the abuse of power that it takes pains specifically
to forbid abuses whose likelihood it foresees and to free the citizen from the duty to obey power so abused, and which so recognizes
the possibility that even express restrictions may be violated, that
it provides for courts with power to declare and to protect the
liberty to disobey. It seems a questionable doctrine when applied
to a Constitution which, recognizing the fact that it may not have
anticipated all kinds of laws that ought not to be made, says in
the Ninth Amendment "The enumeration in the Constitution of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." This, at least, asserts a moral duty in
the government not to make unconscionable laws, and asserts it
in the form of at least a moral privilege in the people analogous
to the legal privilege which exists when the law is void.
Perhaps this is the first time that the moral supremacy of
law over conscience has been authoritatively announced in this
country. Congress has not always thought that good citizenship
requires unqualified submission to law. The Hungarian Louis
Kossuth was convicted and imprisoned for treason. After his release he incited and led a rebellion against the Austrian government. He did more than refuse to defend the constitution and laws
of his country. He endeavored by arms to overthrow them, insisting on his own interpretation of the will of God. Being beaten,
he fled with companions to Turkey. Congress, by resolution of
March 3, 1851,15 requested the President to offer "those noble
exiles" a man-of-war to bring them to the United States. When
he arrived, it was resolved "That Congress in the name and behalf
of the people of the United States give to Louis Kossuth a cordial
welcome to the capital and the country." Some few opposed the
resolution, but Charles Sumner, speaking in support of it,1" called
it "an act of no small significance."
"It will become a precedent whose importance will grow in the
thick coming events of the future with the growing might of the
republic

.

.

.

I see in him, more than in any other living man, the

power which may be exerted by a single earnest, honest soul in a noble

cause . . . Such a character . . . deserves our homage . . . Like

15. 9 Stat. 647.
16. Congressional Globe, Vol. 21, p. 50.
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Lafayette, he has served the cause of freedom, and whoever serves
this cause is entitled according to his works to the gratitude of every
true American bosom."
In speaking in Parliament upon the Stamp Act, the elder
Pitt repudiated the notion that disobedience to misgovernment must
show justification in law. He said:
"I have not come here with the statute book doubled down in dogs'
ears to defend the cause of liberty. I rejoice that America has resisted.
Three millions of people so dead to all the natural sentiments of
liberty as voluntarily to submit to be made slaves would have been fit
instruments to have made slaves of all the rest."
But Pitt had not read the opinion in the Macintosh case. According to that opinion it is only that kind of citizen that Congress is willing to admit, the kind that will promise unqualified
submission and abjure in toto the right of private judgment.
Is this self-respecting nation, confident in the justice of its
laws, so distrustful of its ability to enforce them sufficiently for
practical purposes that it cannot afford to admit as a citizen a man
of intelligence and unblemished character because he is too conscientious to promise blind and absolute submission to anything
and everything that may happen temporarily to acquire the force of
7

law ?1

17. The editor has called the writer's attention to the following item
which appears in the Civil Liberties Quarterly for September. 1931. It shows
how the process of imputing to the Constitution principles which the Constitution does not express can be extended indefinitely:
PUBLIC OWNERSHIP BELIEF BARS ALIEN AS A CITIZEN

Strange ideas of what constitutes a good citizen prevail in California.

Jacob Hullen, Santa Rosa poultryman has been denied naturalization by
Judge Ben Jones of Lake county on the ground that he is "not attached
to the principles of the Constitution." This ruling was based on Hullen's
opinions voiced in court that public utilities should be owned and operated
by the government for the people's benefit, and that some day even the farms
would be publicly owned.
A. W. Hollingsworth, attorney for the Civil Liberties Union, pointed

out to the judge that such beliefs were not unconstitutional, and that Hullen
was not an enemy of organized government. The court's decision will be
appealed.

